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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

DARKNESS ON THE EDGE OF TOWN1: REFORMING MUNICIPAL
EXTRATERRITORIAL PLANNING & ZONING IN ILLINOIS TO
ENSURE REGIONAL EFFECTIVENESS & REPRESENTATION

The City of Collinsville, Illinois, is famous for many things. Collinsville, a
municipality of 24,707 people just east of the Mississippi River,2 is home to
the world’s largest bottle of ketchup—a steel 100,000 gallon capacity, twentyfive foot diameter roadside attraction listed on the National Register of Historic
Places, complete with a website and dedicated fan club.3 Collinsville’s
prominence in the mind of the condiment conscious is further elevated by its
status as the Horseradish Capital of the World—fulfilling sixty percent of the
world’s horseradish demand and hosting the annual International Horseradish
Festival.4 This suburban community, twelve miles east of St. Louis, Missouri,
is attempting to add to its already global resume—as home to a major
professional soccer franchise.5
Collinsville’s international prominence in horseradish is not enough of a
draw for Major League Soccer to consider putting down roots. Rather, league
requirements and expectations demand the provision of a proper sporting
venue to showcase any potential expansion team. Collinsville plans to deliver
on these expectations and then some.6 The efforts of the city include the
construction of an 18,500 seat soccer-specific stadium in a 400-acre complex.7
Additional economic development plans for the surrounding complex include
the construction of two 120-room hotels and 500,000 square feet of retail and

1. BRUCE SPRINGSTEEN, DARKNESS ON THE EDGE OF TOWN (Columbia Records 1978).
2. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, PROFILES OF GENERAL
DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS: ILLINOIS CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING 1784
(2001), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2000/dp1/2kh17.pdf.
3. See generally The World’s Largest Catsup Bottle, http://www.catsupbottle.com/faqs/
index.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2009).
4. See generally International Horseradish Festival, http://www.horseradishfestival.com/
id14.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2009).
5. See generally Press Release, City of Collinsville, Ill., City of Collinsville, St. Louis
Soccer United Detail Numbers Related to Pre-Annexation Agreement (Aug. 31, 2007), available
at http://216.8.64.82/portals/0/Press%20Releases/AnnexationAgtRelease.pdf.
6. Id. at 1–2.
7. Id.
495

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

496

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXVIII:495

office space.8 All of this planned development is to be intermingled with 1,600
residential housing units in a new-urbanist neighborhood design.9
Various common development vehicles have been adopted by the city,10
including the creation of a tax increment financing district and enterprise zone
tax benefits.11 Public reporting of the projected upside for the city includes
two million dollars worth of profits on the stadium as well as the sales tax
revenues generated from one million visitors a year and their consequent
130,000 hotel stays and forty-three million dollars in spending within the
development.12
Clearly, a development of such size and visibility will serve as not only a
boon to the economy of Collinsville, but as a generator of tourist dollars and
improvements given its economically regional scope. Inevitably, the potential
team will draw on the identity and cache of the deep soccer tradition in nearby
St. Louis. By identifying the team with the greater St. Louis metropolitan area,
the organization will hold itself out to the rest of the country as representative
of the St. Louis region, rendering the project regional in a cultural sense as
well.
What makes these efforts by the City of Collinsville unusual is that they
are directed toward a development which is not wholly within their municipal
limits. This reaching out across jurisdictional boundaries represents a
movement by the city beyond what is normally considered its domestic
interests and into a region-impacting development affecting a variety of
stakeholders from residents, counties and cities sharing extraterritorial
jurisdiction, making the project also regional politically.

8. Id. at 2.
9. Id.
10. Collinsville Approves TIF to Fund Soccer Stadium, ST. LOUIS BUS. J., Jan. 30, 2008, at
XX, available at http://stlouis.bizjournals.com/stlouis/stories/2008/01/28/daily38.html. See
generally ILL. DEP’T OF COMMERCE AND ECON. OPPORTUNITY, ENTERPRISE ZONE FISCAL YEAR
ANNUAL REPORT 1–2 (2006) [hereinafter ENTERPRISE ZONE FISCAL YEAR ANNUAL REPORT],
available at http://www.commerce.state.il.us/NR/rdonlyres/9325D298-0ABE-4376-A17A-67E96
591A027/0/EZAnnRept_06.pdf.
11. An Enterprise Zone is a specific designation of an area by the Illinois Department of
Commerce and Economic Opportunity which provides a variety of tax incentives to existing and
potential employers for expanding or locating their operations within the boundaries of the zone.
State tax incentives include exemptions to utility taxes, machinery and equipment/pollution
control sales taxes, credits for qualified investments and job creation, and income tax deductions
to dividends for business located in the zone, interest to financial institutions providing financing
in the zone, and for qualified contributions to organizations located within the zone. Potential
local incentives include waivers to licensing requirements, property taxes, and streamlined
permitting and zoning requirements among others. ENTERPRISE ZONE FISCAL YEAR ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 10, at 1–3.
12. Alex Fees, Collinsville Takes Step Toward Soccer Stadium (Sept. 10, 2007),
http://www.ksdk.com/news/news_article.aspx?storyid=129129.
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The City of Collinsville is assisted in this cross-jurisdictional endeavor by
statutory grants of power providing cities with the ability to develop and
implement comprehensive plans for contiguous lands within a one and a half
mile radius from their corporate limits,13 as well as zoning authority for the
regulation of such land.14 This statutory reach across jurisdictional boundaries
is a clear recognition of the potential regional impact of a single municipality’s
development efforts.
Today, large and sophisticated developments are rarely purely private
initiatives. When major developments take the form of a public-private
partnership, their impact becomes regional economically, culturally and
politically. The Collinsville soccer stadium is but a recent example serving as
a useful impetus for rethinking the statutory scheme which makes these crossjurisdictional, region-impacting developments possible in Illinois. Further, it
provides an opportunity to devise reforms to ensure that these regional
decisions are being made by the proper authority and that the interests of the
various stakeholders are protected while the full potential of the regional
development is realized. This may be accomplished, as this article proposes,
by focusing on two main prongs of statutory reform: ensuring effective
regionalism and representation.
This article will explore the current statutory provisions in Illinois which
provide for extraterritorial exercise of powers for effecting land
development—including provisions for extraterritorial zoning as well as
comprehensive planning and subdivision regulation—and will propose
statutory reforms to maintain two key elements: effectiveness and
representation of all involved.
Part I of this article will examine extraterritorial zoning in the United
States. Attention will be paid to the extent of use and its purported
justifications—both legitimate and illegitimate. This section will then focus on
the constitutionality of extraterritorial zoning and the general exercise of
extraterritorial power as established by the Supreme Court.
Part II will analyze the development of extraterritorial powers in Illinois
regarding zoning and comprehensive planning. The article will then discuss
the scope and operation of these statutes as they exist today. Finally, an
analysis will be made of the decisions of Illinois courts which have interpreted
these statutes when adjudicating the frequent conflicts arising out of the
exercise of extraterritorial authority.
Part III of the article will critique the current statutory scheme of
extraterritorial zoning and land regulation in Illinois. The article focuses

13. 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-12-5 (2007). In Illinois, a municipality’s extraterritorial
jurisdiction is identified as those contiguous lands which lie within unincorporated area and are
contained within a one-and-a-half mile radius from the corporate limits of the municipality.
14. § 5/11-13-1.
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particularly on issues of adequate representation of all the interested regional
stakeholders in cross-jurisdictional developments and also on the effectiveness
of the current scheme in effectuating well-planned and thoughtful regional
development. Through this critique, the article will demonstrate how the
current scheme is particularly detrimental to the promotion of a coherent
regional development plan and is a mechanism for continuations of local
parochialism and its attendant consequences to the economic health of the
region. Further, though the current statutory scheme provides some
mechanisms for intergovernmental relations, this section will note that these
mechanisms are either procedural systems of checks and balances or illusory in
their ability to promote intergovernmental cooperation. While the current
legislative scheme may be adequate, and certainly preferable to an absence of
intergovernmental considerations, considerable room exists for improving a
cooperative form of representation which can address the concerns of all
stakeholders.
Finally, Part IV will offer a variety of potential reforms to these statutes in
order to provide a greater degree of representation to the affected stakeholders
in extraterritorial developments and consequently, provide a heightened degree
of validity and community support to the goals and objectives of the
comprehensive plans, developments, and zoning regulations in the
extraterritorial jurisdiction. Particular attention will be paid to comparative
statutes in North Carolina and Missouri which can serve as models for Illinois.
Also, suggested reforms will be made to promote a more cooperative approach
to extraterritorial land use decisions so that regional considerations will be
emphasized in extraterritorial decision making rather than the damaging effects
of local parochialism normally inherent in the exercise of extraterritorial
powers.15
I. EXTRATERRITORIAL PLANNING AND ZONING
A.

Justifications & Uses of Extraterritorial Power

Statutes granting municipalities extraterritorial police power, as planning
and zoning regulations are generally considered,16 have been in existence for
well over one hundred years.17 Their modern-day incarnations have their roots

15. See generally Nestor Davidson, Cooperative Localism: Federal-Local Collaboration in
an Era of State Sovereignty, 93 VA. L. REV. 959 (2007); Laurie Reynolds, Intergovernmental
Cooperation, Metropolitan Equity and the New Regionalism, 78 WASH. L. REV. 93 (2003);
Sheryll Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, and the Tyranny of the Favored Quarter: Addressing the
Barriers to New Regionalism, 88 GEO. L.J. 1985 (2000).
16. 8 EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 25.17 (3d ed. 2000).
17. David E. Hunt, Comment, The Constitutionality of the Exercise of Extraterritorial
Powers by Municipalities, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 151, 157 (1977).
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in post-World War II development booms on the fringes of the nation’s urban
areas.18
Traditionally, exercise of this power by a municipality has both selfish and
charitable, justifications: the protection of residents by controlling
development beyond its borders, and the well-being of those residents residing
in the extraterritorial jurisdiction who would normally lack municipal-level
“services.”19 Municipal motivation, however, is a secondary impetus. The
primary interest advanced in extraterritorial regulation is that of the state, the
local government acting as its arm.20 Examples of land use-related
justifications of extraterritorial power include easing transitions between urban
and rural areas, the protection of property values, the facilitation of
infrastructure and natural resource coordination and planning.21 Such
extraterritorial powers are also purported to improve intergovernmental
cooperation.22 The extent to which these powers foster cooperation among
local governments, however, is largely a function of the statutory scheme
granting the extraterritorial power.23
The purported uses, while logical and accepted as genuine interests of state
and local government regulation, are not the sole targets toward which such
statutes have been aimed. For example, extraterritorial land regulation has also
been an integral tool in the continued racial segregation of many areas of the
country.24 Despite any questions of the legitimacy of local government
motivations, it is clear that extraterritorial authority has an established place in
the regulation of land beyond municipal limits. As established tools of
regulation, extraterritorial zoning and planning statutes will likely remain as
long as communities continue to expand and there are development pressures
on the peripheries of more urban communities. Consequently, to ensure the
validity of the regulations, it is important that they are structured in ways to
address concerns of representation and effective regional planning.

18. David W. Owens, Extraterritorial Zoning Authority (Mar. 2006), http://www.sog.unc.
edu/organizations/planning/keyissues/extra.htm.
19. Hunt, supra note 17, at 151–52.
20. Richard Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem in Metropolitan Areas, 48
STAN. L. REV. 1115, 1131 (1996).
21. Washington County Cooperative Extension, Extraterritorial Fact Sheet (Jan. 31, 2007),
available at http://washington.uwex.edu/cnred/growth/ETZ.html.
22. Id.
23. See discussion infra Part III.
24. See generally Allen M. Parnell et al., The Persistence of Political Segregation: Racial
Underbounding in North Carolina (Oct. 24, 2004), available at http://www.voicesfor
justicenc.org/resources/26d7695192efc5900b4019a7ab32ace1_regional_underbounding.pdf.
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Constitutionality of Extraterritorial Power

The concept of representation is central to our democratic system of
governance.25 The ability to alter the composition of our legislatures when our
interests are not being represented is the foundation of democracy, and the
denial of representation has been anathema to American values since our
founding. Indeed, the ability of citizens to influence their governance in
accordance with their own self-interest or with the interest of society is central
to democracy.26 A statutory mechanism which grants power to a governmental
entity over citizens with no commensurate representation is surely bound to
encounter challenges, practically and constitutionally. Extraterritorial powergranting statutes are precisely these sorts of mechanisms. The residents living
in extraterritorial jurisdictions receive no representation that may be reflected
in the composition of the planning commissions responsible for developing the
comprehensive plans and implementing binding zoning regulations for their
neighborhoods.27 As would be expected, extraterritorial statutes have been the
target of numerous challenges, and the Supreme Court has held them to be
valid under multiple lines of constitutional attack.28
In Holt Civic Club, a small unincorporated civic association and several
individual residents brought a statewide class action to challenge the
constitutionality of a variety of Alabama statutes granting extraterritorial
authority to municipalities within the state.29 The residents claimed that the
exercise of these powers by the City of Tuscaloosa over their unincorporated
area constituted a violation of their Due Process and Equal Protection rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment.30 The facts in Holt Civic Club lent

25. Briffault, supra note 20, at 1132 (citing ROBERT A. DAHL, AFTER THE REVOLUTION?:
AUTHORITY IN A GOOD SOCIETY 64 (1970)).
26. G. Sidney Buchanan, Upping the Procedural Ante: A Study in Conflicting Democratic
Values, 37 BRANDEIS L.J. 175, 175–76 (1999) (“Preserving equal access to the political process
also promotes an important democratic value: procedural equality among citizens in their efforts
to move the political system in the direction that they deem best for themselves and society.”).
27. This is specifically the case in Illinois where the statutes granting municipalities
extraterritorial authority to develop comprehensive plans as well as binding zoning ordinances,
contain no provision which would provide for the direct involvement or representation of the
residents in the affected extraterritorial jurisdiction. Statutes provide for a method of
representation for municipalities themselves in the zoning process in their extraterritorial
jurisdiction where the zoning authority properly rests with the county government—resulting in a
situation where regardless of the locus of zoning authority, the residents of the extraterritorial
jurisdiction are subject to the direct authority or indirect procedural influence of a city in which
they receive no representation. See discussion infra Part II.
28. Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60 (1978) (holding that Alabama
statutes providing cities with extraterritorial police powers do not violate due process or equal
protection rights of residents of the extraterritorial jurisdiction).
29. Id. at 62–63.
30. Id.
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themselves to the prediction of an Equal Protection challenge, being
characterized as a “truly hard case.”31 Because the extraterritorial residents
were subject to the same effects of the specific regulations as those lying
within the municipal limits, it would seem to follow that if the Constitution did
not provide them complete franchisement, neither did it completely deny it in
circumstances where extraterritorial residents are equally affected.32
Despite the Supreme Court’s characterization of this argument as one with
“logical appeal,” the Court nevertheless upheld the constitutionality of the
extraterritorial statutes on other grounds.33 The Court based its decision almost
purely on geographic grounds, contending that the “‘one man, one vote’
principle” had never been extended “beyond the geographic confines of the
governmental entity concerned . . .” and that “the line [establishing] voter
qualifications . . . coincides with the geographical boundary of the
governmental unit at issue. . . .”34 Further, the court dismissed the argument
that the binding nature of the municipal regulations on the extraterritorial
residents required extension of voting rights for those residents.35 The Court
reasoned that municipal regulation inevitably impacts territory beyond its
borders and such impacts have never previously provided grounds for
franchisement to those affected individuals.36
Justice Brennan attacked both the strict geographic and collateral-effect
lines of reasoning given by the majority.37 Accusing the majority of ascribing
a “talismanic significance” to corporate boundaries, Justice Brennan identified
the proper scope of the franchise as extending to a “political community”
Because a political
rather than state law residency determinations.38
community is characterized by a relationship between a governing body and
those living within its jurisdiction, and Alabama cities had binding authority to
regulate its extraterritorial jurisdiction, it followed that the Holt residents were
part of the political community. Thus, they were properly due the extension of
the franchise in municipal elections.39 Finally, Justice Brennan found the
majority’s reasoning that the principle of non-residents subject to the sideeffects of municipal action not being extended voting rights to be applicable to
the extraterritorial residents unconvincing.40 The residents of Holt, Justice

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Hunt, supra note 17, at 171.
Id.
Holt Civic Club, 439 U.S. at 70, 75.
Id. at 69.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 81–88 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Holt Civic Club, 439 U.S. at 81–82 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 82–85.
Id. at 87–88.
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Brennan distinguished, were not merely experiencing the side effects of
municipal action—but were the direct subjects of regulation.41
Illinois courts have followed the Supreme Court’s holding in Holt Civic
Club when hearing challenges to municipal extraterritorial authority on
representational grounds.42 In Town of Northville, the Township of Northville
and the individual plaintiffs claimed a violation of their voting rights due to
their inability to vote in Sheridan municipal elections despite being subject to
Sheridan’s extraterritorial zoning ordinance.43 The court explicitly found Holt
Civic Club to be controlling and adopted the analysis given by the Supreme
Court.44 Agreeing with the rationale that because municipal effects on
surrounding areas do not normally give rise to franchisement for the affected
area, the franchise should similarly not extend to those non-residents in
Sheridan’s extraterritorial jurisdiction affected by the municipality’s zoning
ordinance.45 Thus, the court held that extraterritorial zoning without
representation of extraterritorial residents does not violate the voting rights of
those residents.46
The Supreme Court’s decision in Holt Civic Club has clearly provided
constitutional authority to municipal exercises of extraterritorial power. While
this decision has largely precluded extraterritorial power granting statutes from
further constitutional challenges, it has not done much to soften what is an
intuitive abrasiveness to our core democratic ideals of what constitutes proper
representation.47 As such, extraterritorial zoning is still subject to many of the
same criticisms today as those claimed by the residents of Holt, Alabama, in
the 1970s. Despite their validity at law, these extraterritorial statutes, without
representational provisions, will continue to inhibit the validity of the land use
plans and policies necessary to promote smart regional growth.

41. Id. at 87.
42. Town of Northville v. Vill. of Sheridan, 655 N.E.2d 22, 25 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
43. Id. at 23–24.
44. Id. at 25.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Memorandum from North Dakota Legislative Council on Extraterritorial Zoning
Authority of Cities to Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations 1 (July 2007)
(noting that the impetus for a moratorium and study on extraterritorial authority stems from
representational concerns of extraterritorial residents), available at http://www.legis.nd.gov/
assembly/60-2007/docs/pdf/99013.pdf; Minnehaha County, South Dakota, Comprehensive
Development Plan 9-4-1 (Dec. 1998), available at http://www.minnehahacounty.org/dept/pl/
comprehensive_plan/comprehensive_plan/9-4-1general_overview.pdf.
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II. OPERATION OF THE CURRENT EXTRATERRITORIAL STATUTORY SCHEME
A.

Extraterritorial Zoning

It is widely accepted that municipalities, as subdivisions of the state, have
the ability to exercise only those powers granted to it by the state.48 Prior to
the adoption of the amendments to the Illinois Municipal Code in July 1961,49
extraterritorial zoning was a municipal power which went unrecognized by the
Illinois courts.50 In Village of Bensenville v. County of DuPage, for example,
the court decided whether the village had the “power to attack” county zoning
regulations.51 The Village claimed an implied zoning authority over the
unincorporated area sought to be zoned by the county based on the provision of
other statutory extraterritorial grants of power.52 Strictly construing the
statutes, the court reasoned that no express zoning power to the Village and the
express grant to the County, required that no implied zoning authority for the
Village could be found.53
Within months after the Bensenville decision, the legislature enacted an
express grant of power to Illinois municipalities to implement zoning
regulations on their extraterritorial jurisdiction.54 This ability on the part of
municipalities, however, is not without certain limitations. The most basic
limitation of extraterritorial zoning is the size of the jurisdiction. The enabling
statute provides that Illinois municipalities may extend their zoning authority
on those lands “within contiguous territory not more than one and one-half
miles beyond the corporate limits” of the municipality.55 This language is
strictly construed, as non-contiguous land within the designated radius has
been found by Illinois courts to be outside the reach of municipal action.56
Additionally, the land must not be part of any other municipality.57 Further, no
other municipality may have already implemented a zoning ordinance within
the original city’s extraterritorial jurisdiction.58 Finally, and perhaps most
limiting, is the prohibition of extraterritorial zoning by municipalities which lie

48.
49.
50.
1961).
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

2A EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 10:8 (3d ed.).
See 1961 Ill. Laws 3697.
See generally Vill. of Bensenville v. County of DuPage, 174 N.E.2d 403 (Ill. App. Ct.
Id.
Id.
Id.
65 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-13-1 (2007).
Id.
Vill. of Bensenville, 174 N.E.2d at 403.
§ 5/11-13-1.
Id.
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in a county that has enacted its own zoning code for unincorporated areas.59
However, the prohibition is subject to a particularly narrow exception.60
B.

Extraterritorial Comprehensive Planning & Subdivision Regulation

A predecessor, and now contemporary, statutory provision of
extraterritorial power to regulate land is section 5/11-12-5 of the Illinois
Municipal Code. This section provides municipalities with the ability to
establish planning commissions for the development of comprehensive plans to
guide the future development of the municipality.61 The statute provides that
the planning commission may extend its focus of a comprehensive plan to
include contiguous lands within a one-and-a-half mile radius of the corporate
boundary.62 Further, the commission may identify such land suitable for
annexation and provide recommendations for zoning classifications of the land
should annexation occur.63
C. Jurisdictional Conflicts in Extraterritorial Developments
With multiple statutes providing authority for the regulation of
unincorporated extraterritorial jurisdictions, it is inevitable that confusion and
conflict occurs where multiple municipalities and counties lay claim to binding
regulations for the area.64 These disputes have been the subject of a

59. Id. This restriction on extraterritorial zoning authority is particularly difficult for
municipalities seeking to exercise their zoning power because the Illinois municipalities with the
highest populations, most intensive land use and consequent need for zoning regulation to control
peripheral development, also lie predominantly in counties which have enacted their own binding
zoning ordinances for their unincorporated land.
60. Id. The statute provides for the exception where municipalities with a population in
excess of 112,000 which reside in counties with a population less than 185,000 may continue to
exert their zoning influence onto their extraterritorial jurisdiction despite the existence of a
county-level zoning ordinance. Only five cities had a 2000 Census population greater than
112,000 (Aurora, Chicago, Naperville, Peoria, and Rockford). ILL. DEP’T OF COMMERCE &
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY, 2000 CENSUS POPULATION COMPARED TO 1990: ILLINOIS
MUNICIPALITIES 1, available at http://illinoisgis.ito.state.il.us/census2000/censusData/2000/docs/
munipop.pdf. Further, of those municipalities, only Peoria (112,936) lies completely within a
county with a 2000 Census population of less than 185,000 (Peoria County, 183,433). U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, PUBL’N NO. PHC-1-15, ILLINOIS: 2000 SUMMARY
POPULATION AND HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS 63, 88 (Aug. 2002) [hereinafter ILLINOIS
SUMMARY POPULATION AND HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS], available at http://www.census.gov/
prod/cen2000/phc-1-15.pdf. Aurora lies partially within Kendall County (Population 54,544).
Id. at 88.
61. § 5/11-12-5.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. For example, Madison County, Illinois, a county with a zoning code governing the land
use of unincorporated area, is also home to thirty municipalities. ILLINOIS SUMMARY
POPULATION AND HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS, supra note 60, at 52. Each of these
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considerable amount of jurisprudence in the Illinois courts despite the
provision of possible resolutions to such extraterritorial jurisdictional conflicts
in the statutes.
1.

Extraterritorial Conflict Between Municipalities

Discrepancies between municipalities with overlapping extraterritorial
jurisdictions are clearly addressed by the statutes. The court articulated the
outcomes of various jurisdictional conflicts in the late 1960s in Village of
Mount Prospect v. County of Cook.65 In discussing these potential conflicts
between municipalities, the court identified three different statutory provisions
created by the legislature which provide municipalities with means to resolve
extraterritorial zoning disputes.66 These methods range from cooperational to a
purely first-come, first-served grounds for authority.67 First, the court
addressed the cooperative approach which municipalities could take by coming
to an agreement among themselves as to a new boundary where the
extraterritorial jurisdiction of one municipality ends and the other begins, thus
eliminating any overlap and subsequent zoning conflict between them.68
Should the municipalities fail to come to an agreement, the statute provided
that it was acceptable for the cities to literally draw a line on a map to a point
equidistant between the conflicting municipalities to determine the extent of
the extraterritorial jurisdiction of each.69
Second, the legislature identifies an approach which benefits the faster
municipality in implementing an annexation of the disputed area. If a
municipality has zoned its extraterritorial jurisdiction in accordance with a
comprehensive plan, that zoning will be nullified when a different municipality
annexes the extraterritorial jurisdiction into its own corporate boundaries, thus
rewarding the annexing city.70 Finally, the legislature applies the first-come,
first-served approach by providing that once a municipality has established a
comprehensive plan with recommended zoning classifications for its

municipalities will have the ability to institute zoning regulations within their extraterritorial
jurisdiction. With Madison County being 725 square miles, it is easy to see how frequently
extraterritorial jurisdictions may overlap—giving rise to considerable contention in determining
the proper land use planning of unincorporated area. Id. at 590. The City of Collinsville
straddles both Madison and St. Clair Counties, making the city’s extraterritorial land use planning
dependant on multiple county actors. Id. at 52, 68.
65. Vill. of Mount Prospect v. County of Cook, 252 N.E.2d 106 (Ill. App. Ct. 1969) (where a
municipality’s challenge to county authority to grant a change of zoning to property within the
city’s extraterritorial jurisdiction was defeated).
66. Id. at 109–10.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 109.
69. Id.
70. Vill. of Mount Prospect, 252 N.E.2d at 109.
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extraterritorial jurisdiction, municipalities with overlapping jurisdictions were
barred from developing and implementing a comprehensive plan of their own
over the area, even if the original municipality has not annexed the area.71
There is no indication, however, that a second municipality without a
comprehensive plan cannot annex the area covered by a comprehensive plan,
as development of a comprehensive plan for extraterritorial jurisdiction is not a
“condition precedent” to annexation.72
Given the lack of pertinent case law, the provision by the statutes of
explicit terms for reconciling extraterritorial conflict between municipalities
has been effective at curbing these disputes. These varied provisions,
however, while creating harmony among municipal neighbors, do little to
foster true intergovernmental cooperation.73 Consequently, reform of the
method of municipal interaction in extraterritorial land use regulation has the
potential to disrupt a relatively comfortable status quo.
2.

Extraterritorial Conflict Between Municipalities & Counties

Despite statutory accommodations for resolving municipal conflict with
county zoning ordinances in extraterritorial jurisdictions, Illinois courts have
been resolving disputes over the proper zoning authority in these territories for
decades.74
As noted earlier, prior to any explicit grant of zoning power in
extraterritorial jurisdictions, the court generally denied Illinois municipalities
the ability to implement a binding zoning regime.75 Consequently, zoning
authority of a city’s unincorporated extraterritorial jurisdiction remained vested
at the county level.76
With the implementation of an express grant of extraterritorial zoning
power came further challenges by municipalities to county zoning authority in
their extraterritorial jurisdictions.77 Despite this grant of power, Illinois courts
have continuously found the zoning authority of the county to supersede any
zoning ordinance sought to be enacted by a municipality.78 The courts relied
on clear statutory language.79 Addressing the challenge to a county zoning

71. Id.
72. Id. at 110.
73. See discussion infra Part III.A.i.
74. See generally City of Urbana v. County of Champaign, 389 N.E.2d 1185 (Ill. 1979);
County of Will v. City of Naperville, 589 N.E.2d 1090 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992); City of Canton v.
County of Fulton, 296 N.E.2d 97 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973); Vill. of Mount Prospect, 252 N.E.2d at 106;
Vill. of Bensenville v. County of DuPage, 174 N.E.2d 403 (Ill. App. Ct. 1961).
75. Vill. of Bensenville, 174 N.E.2d at 403.
76. Id.
77. See generally, Vill. of Mount Prospect, 252 N.E.2d at 106.
78. Id. at 111.
79. Id. at 109.
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change in Village of Mount Prospect, the court acknowledged that the
legislature had provided municipalities with the general ability to zone
property in their extraterritorial jurisdiction.80 This ability, however, was
clearly without validity in unincorporated areas within counties which have
enacted their own zoning regulations.81 The ability of municipalities to
develop a comprehensive plan and subdivision regulations for the area created
no special authority to preempt this ordering of county superiority.82
Ultimately, the county’s zoning authority in unincorporated territory is
“paramount” regardless of it being situated in a municipality’s extraterritorial
jurisdiction.83
As clear as the relationship seems to have been established by statute, the
interplay between the extraterritorial interests of municipalities and counties is
not without significant influence on one another. The fact that a county
government has enacted a zoning ordinance in the extraterritorial jurisdiction
of a municipality does not completely preclude the municipality from exerting
any influence on the area’s zoning. Rather, the statute provides for a veto-style
mechanism through which a municipality may exercise enough influence to
hinder the passage of unfavorable zoning changes in the jurisdiction.84
The first requirement in this mechanism is the timely notice from the
county to the municipality of a proposed change in the county’s zoning
ordinance within the municipality’s extraterritorial jurisdiction.85 Upon
receiving notice of the proposed change, it is then incumbent upon the
municipality to take advantage of the opportunity to influence the zoning. It
does so through a formalized protest of the zoning alteration and the
development of alternative proposals for consideration by the county’s
commission tasked with the change.86 The municipality’s protest must take
place at the requisite public hearing held by the county.87 At this hearing, the
municipality must submit its alternative zoning recommendations for the
subject area in writing.88
The effect of mounting this protest and provision of zoning alternative is
less substantive than procedural, yet still an effective check on the county’s
zoning power. If the county commission, upon receipt of the protest and
alternatives, continues with the change to the objectionable zoning

80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Vill. of Mount Prospect, 252 N.E.2d at 110.
83. City of Canton v. County of Fulton, 296 N.E.2d 97, 100 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973).
84. 55 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-12007 (2006).
85. Id. Timely notice is considered that which is given fifteen days prior to the public
hearing and published in a newspaper of general circulation.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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classification, the statute requires a heightened majority of the commission for
the change to take effect—from a simple majority to a three-fourths majority.89
In this sense, the municipality’s ability to affect zoning in its extraterritorial
jurisdiction is akin to a presidential veto of legislation which gives rise to a
requisite greater majority to pass legislation in the face of such disapproval.
The final result of this mechanism preserves the primacy of the county’s
zoning ordinance while providing the affected municipality with a mere
procedural check. This check may affect the ability of the county to pass a
zoning ordinance which is detrimental in the opinions of, or more importantly,
to the realization of, the municipal comprehensive plan provided for by statute.
The court has found this procedural redress to be evidence of the
legislature’s intention for resolving zoning disputes between municipal and
county zoning objectives in extraterritorial jurisdictions.90 Further, the scheme
demonstrates the legislature’s plan to maintain the supremacy of county zoning
where conflict arises with municipal land use objectives, though not to
maintain supremacy without at least a consideration and ultimate limitation on
the process of enacting an ordinance.91 The court characterized this procedural
limitation as a reasonable requirement in the face of a county’s practical need
to control land use in unincorporated areas.92
Contrary to the dominant nature of county zoning ordinances over
municipal extraterritorial zoning, municipal subdivision regulatory power
pursuant to section 5/11-12-5 takes precedent over any county subdivision
control ordinance.93 Today, however, with the use of more complicated
developments which include multiple uses, building schemes, specialized
platting and internal streets, the line between zoning regulations and
subdivision regulations has become harder to determine.
The Collinsville development is just such a complex development.
Designated as a “Planned Unit Development,”94 many aspects are integrated
into the plan. These include platting and street networks, traditional
subdivision regulations,95 and designated placement and mixing of various
land uses, which are normally regulated through zoning. Thus, the question of

89. § 5/5-12007.
90. Village of Mount Prospect v. County of Cook, 252 N.E.2d 106, 111 (Ill. App. Ct. 1969).
91. City of Canton v. County of Fulton, 296 N.E.2d 97, 100 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973).
92. Id.
93. City of Urbana v. County of Champaign, 389 N.E.2d 1185, 1187 (Ill. 1979).
94. Clyde W. Forrest, Planned Unit Development and Takings Post Dolan, 15 N. ILL. U. L.
REV. 571, 572–73 (1995) (describing Planned Unit Developments as a relatively modern form of
land development which seeks to incorporate “1. [g]reater use and design flexibility, 2.
[c]lustering and reductions in standards, 3. [p]hasing of investment for the market, 4. [t]ailored
conditions for compatibility, 5. [c]ost sharing in public improvements, and 6. [e]fficiency and
economy of infrastructure”).
95. Id. at 579.
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the proper authority for regulating such a development hinges on whether the
regulations driving the development constitute zoning or subdivision
regulations.
The Illinois Supreme Court made just such a distinction in the case of
Planned Unit Developments.96 In City of Urbana, the city sought to require a
developer to submit his development in the city’s extraterritorial jurisdiction,
characterized as a planned unit development and approved by county
authorities, to municipal subdivision controls.97 The court, in making its
determination of the nature of the development, determined that a city’s ability
to subject an extraterritorial development to subdivision regulations to be
determined not by the presence of subdivided parcels, but by the
“developmental impact upon existing facilities protecting the health and safety
of the municipal residents.”98 By this metric, the court concluded that the
planned unit development was a subdivision under the statute and
consequently subject to municipal subdivision regulation.99
Municipal and county conflict in extraterritorial land regulation has
persisted despite statutory and common law guidance. As more sophisticated
developments are demanded by the market and made possible by developers,
more flexible land use regulatory schemes for governing these developments
will be necessary. There is no reason to expect that new innovations in land
development will fit the subdivision/zoning dichotomy any more neatly than
the well-established Planned Unit Development. Likewise, with the growing
complexity and intensity of new developments,100 the current procedural
character of a municipality’s representation is likely due for reform into
something more substantive in nature.

96. City of Urbana, 389 N.E.2d at 1186–87.
97. Id. at 1186.
98. Id. at 1188.
99. Id.
100. See National Association of Home Builders, Mixed Use and Compact Development,
http://www.nahb.org/page.aspx/category/sectionID=628 (last visited May 28, 2009) (“The
scarcity of land for development has necessitated the intensification of the use of available land to
accommodate future needs. Mixed-use and compact development have become attractive
approaches, especially in towns and villages where services and transportation are most
available.”) The Collinsville development characterizes itself as a new-urbanist development,
providing for greater density and more intense land use with the potential for connection to mass
transit.
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III. CRITIQUE OF THE CURRENT EXTRATERRITORIAL STATUTORY SCHEME
A.

Barriers to Regional Effectiveness
1.

Lack of True Cooperative Mechanisms

Many issues regarding the current scheme’s inability to address regional
concerns are the same issues which have been addressed in extraterritorial land
use provisions since the 1960s. One such long-running difficulty facing
regional planning efforts is the considerable proliferation and subsequent
abundance of municipal governments within a metropolitan area.101 Despite
the general recognition of the various regional drawbacks to excessive political
fragmentation,102 local governments continue to proliferate, and various efforts
to curb the multiplication of jurisdictions has been largely ineffective.103
This trend also holds true for the St. Louis metropolitan area, of which
Collinsville is a part. The metropolitan area is home to well over one hundred
individual municipal governments as well as a variety of regional bodies, both
governmental and private, which are charged with promoting and fostering the
planned development of the region as a whole.104
Problems of growth and development are regional in their impact as the
benefits and externalities of local developments give no consideration to
101. Charles M. Haar, Regionalism and Realism in Land-Use Planning, 105 U. PA. L. REV.
515, 515 (1957).
102. See generally Myron Orfield, The Region and Taxation: School Finance, Cities, and the
Hope for Regional Reform, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 91, 94–102 (2007) (discussing the detrimental
effects of both horizontal and vertical political fragmentation).
103. Reynolds, supra note 15, at 93–94 (noting that the increase in demand for “local
government consolidation, regional legislatures, strengthened municipal annexation powers, and
anti-sprawl growth policies” have all failed to prevent the proliferation of government
fragmentation within metropolitan regions).
104. Madison and St. Clair Counties in southwestern Illinois are served by at least three
significant organizations with missions of fostering regional cooperation concerning the
challenges of growth and economic development. The Southwestern Illinois Development
Authority is an agency created by the state government for the promotion of economic
development in the region. Southwestern Illinois Development Authority, http://www.swida.org/
aboutus.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2009). Other agencies include the East-West Gateway Council
of Governments—a collection of regional local government leaders designed to promote
cooperation in regional planning and growth decisions, East-West Gateway Council of
Governments, http://www.ewgateway.org/aboutus/Staff/Mission/mission.htm (last visited Feb.
15, 2009), as well as the St. Louis Regional Commerce and Growth Association, a private
organization with a similar mission of promoting the development of the region as a whole. St.
Louis Regional Commerce and Growth Association, http://www.stlrcga.org/x64.xml (last visited
Feb. 15, 2009). None of these agencies or organizations has any binding authority on the
planning decisions of the localities in their area of interest. Additionally, as entities created for
the promotion of regional development and problem solving, none of the agencies reach into the
detailed local functions of zoning and comprehensive plan formulation.
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municipal boundaries when creating their real world effect.105 This is clearly
evidenced in the regional character of the Collinsville soccer development
which stretches beyond municipal boundaries and encompasses a regional
scope economically, culturally and politically.
As masters of political subdivisions, states have not implemented any
serious form of legislation which would place a premium on regional
solutions.106 Rather, the focus has remained on keeping decisionmaking
powers vested in local governments by creating statutory frameworks of
municipal operation which are “decidedly anti-regional.”107 When local
governments are not required to address the needs of their neighbors, the result
is generally in the form of self-interested municipal legislation and a distinct
turn toward policies of isolationalism from the greater region.108 In effect,
municipal boundaries have served as artificial “blinders” toward identifying
and exercising proper regional decisionmaking.109 The resulting operation of
local government in land use and planning decisions in Illinois is no different.
The current statutory scheme in Illinois does little to advance any
intergovernmental cooperation between municipalities with overlapping
extraterritorial jurisdiction or between municipalities and counties with binding
zoning ordinances for the area. As discussed earlier, a municipality’s ability to
affect county zoning decisions in its police jurisdiction is largely limited to a
procedural role, essentially one of checks and balances.110 This scheme
regulates the municipality whose police jurisdiction is being zoned to a
procedural veto-style form of participation that can effectively be overridden.
Noticeably absent from the county/municipal relationship in extraterritorial
zoning is any collaborative mechanism that would provide the ability of
counties and municipalities to cooperate and come to a mutually agreeable
consensus on these zoning decisions. Rather, the procedural checks and
balances are non-cooperative in nature if not potentially adversarial. Further,
the statute does not place the relationship on equal footing. The binding nature
of the county zoning ordinance and ability to override any municipal
concern—concerns that are fully recognized by the legislature in the event of a
non-existent county zoning ordinance—in the extraterritorial jurisdiction
effectively subordinates the municipal interest to the regulatory designs of the
county.111

105. David M. Becker, Municipal Boundaries and Zoning: Controlling Regional Land
Development, 1966 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 4 (1966).
106. Reynolds, supra note 15, at 97.
107. Id.
108. Becker, supra note 105, at 12.
109. Haar, supra note 101, at 526.
110. See discussion supra Part II.C.ii.
111. 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-13-1 (2007).
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Even further, the available procedural participation of the municipality in
county zoning decisions has no corollary in the statute providing for the
development of municipal comprehensive plans in the extraterritorial
jurisdiction. Municipal extraterritorial comprehensive planning is less
dramatic than the lack of cooperation in the zoning context, due to the various
natures of comprehensive land use plans as a guide for driving land use
decisions.112 The subdivision regulations available to the municipality to bring
about that plan, however, are still of significance to the county whose
unincorporated territory is being regulated. Yet, there is no statutory provision
providing the county with any similar procedural participation in the
imposition of the regulations, much less any actual cooperative function.
The statutory provisions for municipal cooperation among cities with
overlapping extraterritorial jurisdictions, while varied as discussed in Mt.
Prospect,113 are in their practical effects no greater at facilitating
intergovernmental cooperation than they are in the municipal/county context.
The statutes provided that municipalities with overlapping extraterritorial
jurisdictions could resolve any dispute over authority to implement land use
regulations by voluntarily agreeing as to a proper boundary line delineating the
extent of the extraterritorial jurisdiction of each.114 Further, they could have a
line drawn equidistantly from their respective corporate limits, which would
provide the division of the unincorporated area.115 Both of these options for
resolving extraterritorial disputes provide a means for dividing the jurisdiction,
which the respective municipalities may then independently, and without
reciprocal consideration, regulate as they see fit. As such, the statutory
provision does provide for a level of cooperation regarding extraterritorial
planning and zoning. This “cooperation,” however, merely allows for
municipalities to cooperate in determining the areas in which they may
unilaterally exercise their authority.
Despite the regional nature of the economic, political and cultural effects
of large economic development projects such as the Collinsville soccer
development, the current extraterritorial scheme is one which primarily
empowers the individual municipality to implement local solutions and plans

112. See generally Edward J. Sullivan, Recent Developments in Comprehensive Planning
Law, 39 URB. LAW. 681 (2007). Sullivan identifies three broad categories in which the role of
the municipal comprehensive plan may be placed. Id. at 681. The first such role being a unitary
one with local zoning controls in which the comprehensive plan is meaningless when separate
from the zoning ordinance. Id. A second role is as a factor for consideration when devising land
use planning regulations. Id. Additionally, the comprehensive plan may be categorized as a
“quasi-constitutional” document which drives the formulation of municipal zoning, subdivision,
and other land use planning regulations. Id.
113. Vill. of Mount Prospect v. County of Cook, 252 N.E.2d 106, 109 (Ill. App. Ct. 1969).
114. Id.
115. Id.
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to regional issues without any recognition of the interdependence between
Illinois municipalities, their neighbors and counties.116 Such unilateral
exercise by a local government, be it at the county or municipal level, of a
development decision ignores the legitimate interests of the multiple
stakeholders affected by the development, which could be addressed through
intergovernmental cooperation. This is the antithesis of regionalism.117
2.

Susceptibility to Local Parochialism

In addition to the lack of cooperative measures inherent in the statutory
scheme, the general self-interest of the local governments involved in
extraterritorial development have the potential to create a barrier to the normal
bargaining process which typically takes place between local units of
government in such decisions.118 Because the statutory scheme provides for no
mechanism by which local governments may, or must, enter into cooperative
agreements or negotiations, the ultimate decisionmaking authority remains
vested in the individual municipal or county government. Where the control of
functions such as planning and zoning have been vested in a singular local
entity, that authority has generally been used by that entity to reinforce
particularly local policy at the expense of its extraterritorial and municipal
neighbors.119
Land use decisions, in particular, have been noted for the great amount of
externalities they create on regional actors when the authority is carried out on
a purely local level.120 Nevertheless, cooperation between municipalities with
overlapping extraterritorial jurisdictions, or between municipalities and
counties, is particularly rare.121 The cause for this scarcity is simple selfinterest as “[l]ocalities simply do not enter into cooperative arrangements
under which some localities accept regionally necessary but locally undesirable
land uses.”122 These self-interested actions without regard or input for regional
concerns are the hallmarks of local parochialism.123

116. Becker, supra note 105, at 7.
117. Id. at 13.
118. Haar, supra note 101, at 532.
119. Davidson, supra note 15, at 1024.
120. Briffault, supra note 20, at 1147.
121. Id. (noting that there are “few, if any, voluntary interlocal agreements concerning land
use, zoning, planning, or housing).
122. Id. This rationale makes intuitive sense as well. Considering that the purpose of
municipal police powers is to protect the general health, safety and welfare of a community, it
makes little sense that a locality charged with this power would accept a detrimental land use in
an area of their jurisdiction, such as a landfill, trash transfer station or similar use.
123. Cashin, supra note 15, at 2015. Professor Cashin illustrates the theory of local
parochialism as one “that rests on a belief that fragmented political borders, arising from five
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Local parochialism is particularly problematic when it results in the
shifting of detrimental externalities of local land use regulations onto
neighboring communities.124 This lack of regional consideration of
externalities is readily apparent in the economic development context.125
While cities, it is argued, will naturally consider the impact of new
development to existing commercial activity within its own borders, there is
little motivation, and no requirement, to consider the economic externalities
the development creates beyond its borders.126 While the concept of requiring
a municipality to consider the external effects of its development plans is not
without precedent,127 this concept has gained little traction as a practical
matter.128
Even if the local governments of Illinois were provided with meaningful
mechanisms of intergovernmental cooperation in extraterritorial planning and
zoning, local self-interests would likely make these voluntary associations
unattractive to any governmental unit adversely affected by the ceding of
regulatory authority. Consequently, such arrangements would continue to be
rare, particularly where the benefits of cooperation are not readily apparent.129
Given the rather indirect and subtle nature of the benefits of regional

decades of suburban development, entrench a narrow, ill-conceived conception of self-interest
that blinds citizens to the real potential benefits of collective alliances across borders.” Id.
124. See Amnon Lehavi, Intergovernmental Liability Rules, 92 VA. L. REV. 929, 941 (2006)
(Lehavi notes that cities will reduce their own internal costs by shifting unwanted but lucrative
development to its fringe in an effort to slough off the externalities of the development—be they
pollution or noise, or other similar problem—onto its neighbors. They are less likely to consider
the economic impacts on their neighbors.)
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See Haar supra note 101, at 526–27 (discussing Borough of Cresskill v. Borough of
Dumont, 104 A.2d 441 (N.J. 1954)).
128. The Collinsville soccer development is illustrative of local parochial behavior in an
economic development context. As has been seen in numerous other developments, this
development is subsidized in part through tax increment financing by the City of Collinsville.
Developments financed through TIF which incorporate residential development, as Collinsville
does, are regularly criticized by the affected school districts as the property taxes normally
collected from the residents to support the influx of new students is frozen—leaving the school
district with an increase in student body without the commensurate increase in tax revenue to
fund their educations—resulting in a net decrease in expenditures per pupil within the district.
See Chris Coates, City Council Green-Lights TIF: School Officials ‘Disappointed’ by Vote,
COLLINSVILLE HERALD, Jan. 30, 2008, available at http://collinsvilleherald.stltoday.com/articles/
2008/01/30/news/sj2tn20080130-0130cvj_collinscouncil.ii1.txt. There is some history to indicate
that some of the frozen tax dollars may be passed through to the district, but such possibility has
not alleviated the concerns of the affected school district. Id.
129. Briffault, supra note 20, at 1149.
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cooperation in land use regulation, there is no reason to believe that this would
not continue to be the case.130
There are arguments in defense of maintaining greater local control in
planning and zoning decisions rather than divesting this authority to a regional
governing body.131 Nevertheless, increased local authority over the planning
and zoning decisions in extraterritorial jurisdictions retains a risk of
“exacerbating economic, racial, ethnic and cultural divisions that local
fragmentation engenders, can threaten individual liberties, and may generate
significant externalities on neighboring communities.”132
In sum, extraterritorial planning and zoning are functions with clear
regional impact yet no mandatory regional considerations.133 When power is
vested locally, the potential for community self-interest to prevail over regional
concerns is problematic.134 Consequently, not only must any reforms address
the structural defects of intergovernmental cooperation, they must also address
the human elements capable of frustrating regionally sensitive land use
development in the form of local parochialism.
B.

Representational Concerns

As a matter of democratic theory, “‘[e]veryone who is affected by the
decisions of a government should have the right to participate in that
government.’”135 Under this principle, and despite the holding of the Supreme
Court in Holt Civic Club,136 it is clear that representational concerns in the
exercise of extraterritorial power have been, and remain, a common concern

130. Id. (He notes that “[t]he benefits of ceding local control over local land use regulation
. . . [is] likely to be far less obvious.” Consequently, “the loss of zoning autonomy . . . would
require a major effort to persuade local residents of the benefits of interlocal cooperation.”).
131. See Reynolds, supra note 15, at 102–03. Professor Reynolds provides a description of
two established rationales promoting greater local autonomy including the “public choice”
approach put forward by Professor Clayton Gillette and the “participation theory” promoted by
Professor Gerald Frug. The former champions autonomy for localities as actors in a marketplace
for municipal services—eliminating inefficiencies and abuses. Id. at 102. The latter theory, while
rejecting the service provider role of municipalities, champions local control as a means of
enhancing citizen involvement in the actions and decisions of government. Id. at 102–03.
132. Davidson, supra note 15, at 1023–24.
133. Id. at 1024 (“Local government decisions in most areas of typical local authority,
including land use, housing, transportation, and economic development, have external effects on
neighboring communities, shaping regional economies without any imperative that the
extraterritorial consequences of local decision making be taken into account.”).
134. Id.
135. Briffault, supra note 20, at 1132 (quoting DAHL, supra note 25)).
136. See discussion supra Part I.B.
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for the affected citizens of the extraterritorial jurisdiction.137 While the
Supreme Court has determined that the rights of extraterritorial residents are
satisfied as a matter of constitutional law, the lack of representation remains on
a personal and emotional level for those individuals affected in the
extraterritorial jurisdiction. In addition to the barriers to regional effectiveness
currently experienced by the Illinois extraterritorial statutory scheme, the
statutes also suffer from a lack of comprehensive representation of the affected
stakeholders in extraterritorial decisions including residents of the
extraterritorial jurisdiction, municipalities in county zoning decisions, and
counties and other regional concerns in municipal planning functions.
The current statutory scheme of extraterritorial authority provides very
little in the way of representation neither for the residents of the jurisdiction
nor for the regional interests affected by a local unit’s land use planning and
regulation. Perhaps the lone instance of direct representation of the residents
of an extraterritorial jurisdiction is during the county zoning process, where as
residents of unincorporated county area, the regulations imposed are derived
from those which the residents have political recourse. Illinois statutes do not
preclude the direct representation of extraterritorial residents on municipal
planning commissions. The statute provides that residential eligibility for
service on municipal commissions extends to the limits of a municipality’s
extraterritorial jurisdiction.138 It does not, however, require the membership of
any individual from the extraterritorial area.139
As previously discussed, municipal interests are represented in county
level planning and zoning decisions through a procedural mechanism of checks
and balances.140 Conversely, county and other regional interests are without
any meaningful representation in municipal extraterritorial comprehensive
planning decisions at all. Rather, representation of larger regional concerns
may be reflected in local land use regulations through the development of
regional planning commissions.141 Any county board which determines there
is a need, may create such a regional commission to bring about the
“co-ordinated, adjusted and harmonious development” of the region.142 The
enabling statute characterizes this regional commission as a fact-finding body
and, consequently, contains no provision which would be binding upon the

137. DAVID W. OWENS, U. N.C. SCH. OF GOV’T, SPECIAL SERIES NO. 20, THE NORTH
CAROLINA EXPERIENCE WITH MUNICIPAL EXTRATERRITORIAL PLANNING JURISDICTION 4
(2006), available at http://www.sog.unc.edu/pubs/electronicversions/pdfs/ss20.pdf.
138. 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-12-4 (2007).
139. Id.
140. See discussion supra Part II.C.
141. 55 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-14001.
142. Id.
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various municipal planning and development authorities within the designated
region.143
Additionally, regional concerns may be represented by a joint regional
planning body created by multiple counties to guide the planning process of
their jointly affected regions.144 This joint regional authority is vested with the
ability to coordinate with the encompassed planning bodies in order to guide
coherent regional development.145 This coordination is relegated, however, to
the encouragement of various planning bodies to cooperate with one
another,146 a particularly dubious power considering the previously discussed
influence of parochialism against which such a regional interest must
contend.147
So long as extraterritorial representation is limited to these narrow
procedural confines or toothless regional fact-finding bodies, it remains
unlikely that local governments in Illinois will “consciously forego
intrajurisdictional benefits to prevent interjurisdictional harms.”148 The lack of
representation in the current statutory scheme is a great barrier to the
incorporation of individual and regional concerns and demands in
comprehensive planning and land use decisionmaking. Reform to provide for
greater representation of extraterritorial stakeholders is central to maintaining
the popular validity of the land use regulations, which the scheme makes
possible.
IV. SUGGESTED REFORMS TO THE EXTRATERRITORIAL STATUTORY SCHEME
The following section will focus on two narrow, yet particularly effective,
statutory reforms which would provide for greater regional consideration and
representation in extraterritorial planning and zoning decisions. The first
proposed reform involves various reconfigurations of planning commission
membership in order to more accurately reflect the affected interests of
commission decisions. The second proposed reform would mandate the
inclusion of extraterritorial residents, businesses, and governmental units with
overlapping jurisdictions in the formation of municipal comprehensive plans.
This final reform, it will be suggested, will provide the requisite legitimacy to
municipal regulation in the extraterritorial jurisdiction by taking into account
the interests and concerns of extraterritorial stakeholders.

143. Id.
144. § 5/5-14003.
145. § 5/5-14005.
146. Id.
147. See discussion supra Part III.A.
148. Lehavi, supra note 124, at 931 (explaining that this lack of altruism on the part of
municipalities is a function of the lack of legal mechanisms and political checks on municipal
actors by those beyond its corporate limits).
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Extraterritorial Planning Commissions

There is little reason to suspect voluntary cooperation among local units of
government where the benefit to the individual locality is not clearly visible.149
Consequently, for statutory reform to ensure any form of regional cooperation
and representation, some mandatory mechanism must be incorporated into the
statutory scheme by which local governments will take into account the
considerations of other extraterritorial stakeholders.
One possible method of ensuring this cooperation is through a requirement
that the make-up of the local planning commission consist of a member or
members representing the municipality’s extraterritorial jurisdiction. This
requirement would mandate the currently permissive appointment of
extraterritorial residents to municipal planning commissions.150 The quantity
of extraterritorial representatives and their subsequent participation in planning
commission activities and decisions could be allowed considerable flexibility
while still providing sufficient participation and input in the region.
Extraterritorial considerations could be represented through a sole
commissioner from the jurisdiction, or perhaps more democratically, by a
proportional number of commissioners relative to population. This latter
proportional approach is currently in operation in North Carolina.151 In North
Carolina, for a city to exercise its extraterritorial authority over planning and
zoning matters, it must expand membership of the pertinent governing bodies
to provide for extraterritorial representation.152 The amount of extraterritorial
representatives appointed to these entities is based on the proportional
representation provided by each non-extraterritorial commissioner of
municipal residents.153 Difficulties of implementing proportional
extraterritorial representation have arisen due to the difficulties of establishing
extraterritorial population figures.154 This approach would, however, provide a
proper level of representation to extraterritorial residents on par with those in
the municipality.
Further, frequency of service by extraterritorial representatives on
municipal commissions may be permanent or contingent on whether the

149. Briffault, supra note 20, at 1149.
150. 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-12-4.
151. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32A-362 (2007).
152. OWENS, supra note 137, at 11.
153. Id. Owens provides the example of a municipality of 5,000 residents with five
commissioners and thus a proportional representation of one commissioner per 1,000 residents.
Id. If the extraterritorial jurisdiction had 2,000 residents, two commissioners will be required
from the extraterritorial jurisdiction. Assuming a hypothetical extraterritorial population of
5,000, under this apportionment of commissioners, the City of Collinsville, with a 2006 estimated
population of 25,610 and a planning commission consisting of twelve members, would require at
least two extraterritorial representatives on the commission.
154. Id.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2009]

DARKNESS ON THE EDGE OF TOWN

519

commission is hearing an extraterritorial land use issue. As appointed
officials, a citizen’s representational recourse to planning commission
decisions is through the elected appointing official. Thus, to ensure the
accountability of the extraterritorial representatives, appointment to the
municipal commission should come from an office that extraterritorial
residents may hold accountable at the polls—most likely from some position of
county authority.155
It is important to remember, however, that there are more stakeholders in
the extraterritorial land use decisions than the residents. Neighboring
municipalities, counties, school districts and a variety of other special districts
are also affected by municipal decisions in these areas. Consequently, the
mere inclusion of a proportional representation of residents on municipal
commissions may not be the most effective reform for ensuring truly regional
considerations. Rather, another, and perhaps more representative, approach is
through the creation of a special commission for the planning and zoning
decisions of the extraterritorial jurisdiction.
This special planning commission could draw significant inspiration from
the model set by Missouri’s tax increment financing statutes. Missouri’s TIF
Act vests power in a special commission to hold public hearings and make
recommendations regarding the adoption of public financing by the
municipality administering the TIF.156 The make-up of the TIF Commission is
required to consist, not only of municipal residents appointed by city
officials,157 but also of representatives from affected school districts,158 other
districts imposing ad valorem taxes,159 and various numbers of county-level
representatives.160 This commission make up provides representation for not
only those residents affected by the potential development to be funded by the
TIF, but also to the regional governmental units affected by the development as
well.

155. Id. In North Carolina, the Board of County Commissioners for the affected county makes
the appointment of representatives to the municipal planning authority.
156. MO. REV. STAT. § 99.820.3 (2008).
157. § 99.820.2(3).
158. § 99.820.2(1) (The statute allows each affected school district to place two
representatives on the municipal TIF Commission.).
159. § 99.820.2(2) (The statute provides that taxing districts, besides school districts and
counties, are represented through a shared representative whose selection is determined by
whatever means agreed upon by those districts being affected by the development project.).
160. § 99.820.2(4), (6). As of January 1, 2008, amendments to the TIF statute will require a
heightened county presence on certain municipal commissions in municipalities which are under
the authority of the East-West Gateway Council of Governments. These reforms will likely merit
future study to determine their effect at fostering regionally minded economic development
incentives. See § 99.820(7)–(8).
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A similar special planning commission to decide the land use issues facing
a municipality’s extraterritorial jurisdiction would provide the level of regional
considerations and representation unavailable in the current statutory
scheme.161 The dominant number of municipal representatives ensures that the
city retains its primary role in the comprehensive planning of the
extraterritorial jurisdiction.162 Unlike Missouri’s TIF commissions, however,
these extraterritorial planning commissions should be vested with binding
authority.163 To limit the role of such a commission to a recommending
function would be both duplicitous and defeating as there are already
mechanisms to develop regional planning recommending bodies164 and such
This form of special planning
bodies are historically ineffective.165
commission would allow for full representation of all affected parties as well
as true intergovernmental cooperation in the land use planning decisions of the
municipality’s extraterritorial jurisdiction—compelled cooperation that is
currently lacking.
1.

Concerns of Organizational Self-Interest

One potential concern of the proposed extraterritorial planning commission
stems from its very nature as a forum for intergovernmental cooperation. It
has been argued that a lack of intergovernmental cooperation does not
necessarily
engender
negative
regional
consequences.
Rather,
intergovernmental cooperation may exacerbate the regional concerns which the
extraterritorial planning commission would seek to address.166 Professor
Reynolds posits that there are currently many regional governmental units and
special districts similar to the proposed extraterritorial planning commission.167
Further, the narrowness of the mission of these individual governing bodies
requires that they consider only those goals which they are designed to meet.168

161. See discussion supra Part III.
162. One particular problem with this special form of planning commission arises in the case
where there are municipalities with overlapping extraterritorial jurisdictions. By establishing the
primacy of the municipality on the commission, the notion that the city has the greatest interest to
be considered is preserved. The extraterritorial interests of neighboring municipalities, however,
are no less valid than those of the municipality convening the special commission. In such a case,
it may be admitted that the current statutory scheme provides at least a minimally workable
solution for determining which municipal comprehensive plan governs. So as not to preclude
other municipal interests completely, the special commission could provide membership for those
municipalities similar to the representation provided to other taxing districts and regional
interests.
163. § 99.820.3.
164. See discussion supra Part III.B.
165. Briffault, supra note 20, at 1148.
166. Reynolds, supra note 15, at 98.
167. Id. at 137–38.
168. See id. at 137–43.
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Presumably, since the extraterritorial commission would be charged with the
narrow mission of comprehensive planning and zoning in the extraterritorial
jurisdiction, it would only make decisions based on the best interest of its own
Consequently, the ad hoc intergovernmental
organizational goal.169
cooperation exercised by the commission would reduce the need for the
participating localities to think regionally on a more regular basis and
subsequently exacerbate regional disparities.170
While a special district’s narrow mission may result in another selfinterested actor disregarding regional interests, such concerns are likely not a
factor for the proposed extraterritorial planning commission due to the nature
of its mission as a developer of regulations, comprehensive land use plans and
its structure in general. The nature of comprehensive planning is one with an
eye toward permanence in the proper use of land.171 The resulting plan is a
policy statement to direct future land use decisions.172 Even the individual
zoning actions taken by the extraterritorial commission are done with an eye
toward the implementation of the comprehensive plan.173 Consequently, the
mission of the extraterritorial commission is not one of addressing short-term
interests, but instead to address the long-range considerations of all the
affected stakeholders. Thus, the proposed commission cannot avoid
continually addressing regional concerns, even if only focusing on its narrow
mission.
Additionally, the structure of the proposed extraterritorial commission
itself is distinguishable from regional special districts. The proposed
commission does not come with an attendant bureaucracy or leadership
hierarchy. There is little semblance of an organizational identity intended in
the proposed commission. The commission is less an individual institution
susceptible to self-preservation than it is a compelled forum for discrete
interests to negotiate and develop mutually agreeable land use policies and
regulations.174
2.

Concerns of Local Parochialism & Intergovernmental Competition

Another concern of the proposed commission is the practical effect it
would have in curbing the promotion of self-interested policies by localities at
169. Id. at 144–46.
170. Id. at 123.
171. MCQUILLIN, supra note 16, § 25.79.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. The structure and role of the proposed extraterritorial planning commission as a forum
for negotiation is similar to that of the proposed regional legislatures advanced by Professor Jerry
Frug. See Jerry Frug, Decentering Decentralization, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 253, 297 (1993). One
key difference, however, is that the proposed extraterritorial planning commission would have a
binding authority to implement land use regulation.
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the expense of other extraterritorial stakeholders. Local governments “rarely,
if ever, agree to desist from competing for development against other localities
in the same metropolitan area.”175 Regional governments have done little to
reduce local land use policies with adverse regional affects.176 Further, they
are rarely capable of constraining or displacing the authority of local
government to use land use regulations in order to compete with their
neighbors for new economic development.177
When evaluating the potential effectiveness of the proposed extraterritorial
commission to curb self-interest and intergovernmental competition relative to
other regional bodies, it is important to consider that the proposed commission
is not expansively regional in scope, but regional in the sense that it crosses
jurisdictional boundaries of extraterritorial stakeholders. As such, the proposed
extraterritorial commission would likely be particularly effective as the extent
covered by the commission is an area over which localities are likely to agree
to cooperate voluntarily, given their shared interests in the land use decisions
of the territory.178 Further, by constraining representation to neighboring
governmental units, control remains local, thus satisfying the broad objective
of most land use regulations that they be made principally by the local
governments in whose jurisdiction the territory falls.179 Additionally, the
regional representation on the commission would keep the municipality from
pushing costs of development outside its borders.180
Further, there is no presumption in the recommendation that the
extraterritorial planning commission would eliminate the predisposition of
local governments to act in their self-interests. To the contrary, the commission
would provide a forum for the exercise of the market forces of
intergovernmental bargaining and for bringing about the regionally sensitive
policies such negotiations would create.181 The regional benefits of these
negotiations would not be manifested in the regulations of a more traditional
regional planning body acting without the advocacy of self-interested parties.

175. Briffault, supra note 20, at 1147.
176. Quintin Johnstone, Government Control of Urban Land Use: A Comparative Major
Program Analysis, 39 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 373, 412 (1994).
177. Briffault, supra note 20, at 1147–48.
178. Id. at 1148.
179. Johnstone, supra note 176, at 409.
180. Lehavi, supra note 124, at 942 (characterizing the tendency of local government officials
to push the costs of internal land use regulation across borders as a “fiscal illusion” from which
there is no incentive to refrain).
181. Haar, supra note 101, at 532. See also Gerald E. Frug, Beyond Regional Government,
115 HARV. L. REV. 1763, 1785 (explaining that in the context of voluntary agreements between
local governments, negotiations “allow problems to be addressed with considerable geographic
flexibility”).
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The binding nature of the proposed extraterritorial commission would give the
teeth to regional planning decisions that has historically been lacking.182
The proposed extraterritorial planning commission would act as a check to
the natural exercise of local parochialism. Further, it would provide a forum
for intergovernmental cooperation while the scope and binding nature would
foster a level of regional effectiveness and representation not currently realized
by most regional planning bodies, thus avoiding the silence normally
accompanying the regional commission’s ability to affectuate a plan.183
B.

Extraterritorial Participation in the Comprehensive Planning Process

Another proposed statutory reform is the provision of a requirement which
would compel the extraterritorial planning commission, or if the previous
recommendation were not adopted, the current municipal planning
commission, to solicit and incorporate the involvement of the residents and
businesses of the extraterritorial jurisdiction. Contrary to the drastic structural
reform suggested for representative planning commissions, required
involvement of the extraterritorial residents would simply be a matter of
requiring sound planning practice.
Comprehensive planning serves an important role as a guide for land use
planning policy decisionmaking—particularly when attempting to implement
Smart Growth policies.184 Central to the formulation of a comprehensive plan
is the presence of adequate public participation. Public participation “ensures
that planning outcomes are equitable and based on collective decision
making.”185 Currently, municipal comprehensive plans cannot be adopted until
after proper public notice and public hearing is held.186 Notice must not only
reach the municipal areas, but contiguous unincorporated areas as well.187
These public hearings, however, do not rise to the level of meaningful,
strategic participation which provides a “common ground for decisionmaking.”188

182. Haar, supra note 101, at 522.
183. Id. at 521.
184. AMERICAN PLANNING ASSOCIATION, POLICY GUIDE ON SMART GROWTH 5 (2002)
available at http://www.planning.org/policy/guides/pdf/SmartGrowth.pdf. (“Absent the collective
decision-making processes inherent in effective comprehensive planning, those who would
implement smart growth measures are limited to a series of short-term, geographically isolated,
and disconnected decisions. The comprehensive planning process achieves this through
collective decisions about the intensity, the density and the character of development and the level
of public services to be provided.”).
185. Id. at 2.
186. 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-12-7 (2007).
187. Id.
188. AMERICAN PLANNING ASSOCIATION, supra note 184 at 2.
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The American Planning Association’s Growing Smart Initiative provides a
statutory model for incorporating public participation in the comprehensive
planning process.189 The Initiative’s model statutes for local comprehensive
planning call for the “establishment of formal citizen participation processes to
inform plan-making. . . .”190 Examples of participation include resident and
business owner surveys, public workshops, focus groups, newsletters, media
broadcasts, web presence, written comment, and the creation of advisory task
forces.191
In addition to these model statutes, Illinois may also draw from
comparative statutes which currently provide for greater public participation in
the comprehensive planning process.192 The key, of course, to ensuring
regional effectiveness and extraterritorial representation, is to extend these
forms of public inclusion to the residents and other stakeholders of the
extraterritorial jurisdiction. By incorporating extraterritorial participation in
the comprehensive planning process, whatever the statutory mechanism, a
greater understanding of the potential externalities of municipal action would
be gained.193 Further, extraterritorial participation would constitute a more
expansive use of democratic processes resulting in the “understanding and
acceptance by the people who are affected by the planning” as well.194
C. Other Suggested Reforms
The recommendations for planning commission reform and extraterritorial
resident participation in comprehensive planning are by no means exhaustive
of the potential remedies to ensure greater regional effectiveness and

189. AMERICAN PLANNING ASSOCIATION, GROWING SMART LEGISLATIVE GUIDEBOOK,
MODEL STATUTES FOR PLANNING AND THE MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE 7-1 (Stuart Meck gen.
ed., 2002)
190. Id. at 7-63. The statutes, while calling for citizen participation, leave the determination
of appropriate methods of implementing such participation to the discretion of the local planning
authority.
191. Id. at 7-199.
192. The Legislative Guidebook identifies a number of states currently requiring public
participation in the comprehensive planning process including: Arizona (ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 9-461.06(E) (2008)); District of Columbia (D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-1002(3), (4)(A) (2008));
FLORIDA (FLA. STAT. § 163.3181(1) (2006)); IDAHO (IDAHO CODE ANN. § 67-6507 (2006));
Maine (ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30-A, § 4324(3) (1996)); OREGON (OR. REV. STAT §
197.160(B) (2007)); and Washington (WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.140 (2003)).
193. See Charles M. Haar, The Master Plan: An Impermanent Constitution, 20 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 353, 360 (1955) (Haar notes that “the chief purpose of the master plan is that
of mutual education. In the process of making a master plan, the planner may learn which issues
are the relevenat ones so far as the people are concerned, what terms are meaningful to them, and
which alternatives make sense as they view them. This education of the planning board and staff
is crucial for any plan to survive.”).
194. Id.
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representation. Various alternatives have been found in the literature but not
included within the scope of this article. One such alternative consists of
establishing a system of liability between intraregional units of local
government.195 This system would recognize a compensable claim against a
municipality if a particular zoning, development or other enacted land use
planning regulation is found to be the cause of a measurable harm to a
neighboring municipality.196 The potential for intergovernmental liability for
land use planning regulations, it is argued, would result in the fiscalization of
zoning decisions197 and subsequent internalization by municipalities of the
costs of their regulation, thus driving intergovernmental competition in a
positive direction.198
Another proposed alternative which would ensure greater extraterritorial
representation is the extension of voting rights to extraterritorial residents.199
While there has been no recognized right of extraterritorial residents to vote in
municipal elections,200 limiting electoral participation to the extent of corporate
boundaries remains an arbitrary constraint on the franchise—particularly when
the consequences of municipal actions are felt beyond its borders.201
Finally, the American Planning Association has promoted the potential
reorganization and consolidation of local governments.202 By reducing
political fragmentation, consolidation of local governments would facilitate the
requisite coordination for implementing “Smart Growth” policies.203 At a
minimum, the American Planning Association suggests placing the issues of
urban growth through an intergovernmental planning process, such as the
proposed commission, to generate cooperative, “mutually beneficial
decisions.”204

195. Lehavi, supra note 124, at 933.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 949.
198. Id. at 934.
199. Briffault, supra note 20, at 1120–21. Professor Briffault identifies the contention put
forward by Professors Ford and Frug that the extension of the franchise to extraterritorial voters
“would improve metropolitan area governance without creating undesireable regional institutions
or shifting local power to higher levels of government.” Id. at 1121.
200. Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 68–69 (1978) (“No decision of this
Court has extended the ‘one man, one vote’ principle to individuals residing beyond the
geographic confines of the governmental entity concerned, be it the State or its political
subdivisions.”).
201. Note, The Right to Vote in Municipal Annexations, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1571, 1577 (1975)
(identifying that “except for the [municipal] boundary itself, there is ordinarily no clear line to
separate the substantially from the peripherally affected [by municipal actions]”).
202. AMERICAN PLANNING ASSOCIATION, supra note 184 at 5–6.
203. Id.
204. Id.
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While the literature certainly contains more examples which would ensure
regional effectiveness and representation, these few proposals are illustrative
of the creative options available to Illinois lawmakers when developing
potential statutory reforms to municipal extraterritorial planning and zoning.
CONCLUSION
The concept of representation is at the core of our country’s democratic
process. Democratic processes are essential to the legitimacy of local
comprehensive planning efforts. The current Illinois statutory scheme of
extraterritorial planning and zoning provides little in the way of meaningful
representation of, or cooperation with, neighboring local governmental units or
extraterritorial residents. Consequently, parochial land use decisions and
development may create significant regional externalities. Through the
proposed restructuring and creation of extraterritorial planning commissions as
well as the required solicitation of extraterritorial participation in the
comprehensive planning process, the land use decisions affecting increasingly
sophisticated and regionally impacting developments will enjoy an increased
level of legitimacy and public support. While not exhaustive of the
possibilities, these proposed statutory reforms present small, manageable steps
for avoiding a future “tragedy of the regional ‘commons’”205 in Illinois.
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